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A B S T R A C T
Environmental concerns and potential social-economic impacts associated with fossil fuels have turned cities
into indispensable entities for supporting energy transitions in China. Pursuing a transition towards a
sustainable energy system has become a major policy concern for the Chinese central government. In response,
and on the basis of a top-down and conformance-oriented system of policy implementation and evaluation, the
Chinese central government has launched various policies and targets on energy eﬃciency and production that
lower levels of government have to follow. However, the translation of top-down targets and the measurement
of conformance-based targets have both proved to be problematic. This paper investigates Chinese state policy
on energy eﬃciency through four empirical case studies. It identiﬁes how policy design of target setting and
evaluation is both impacting and driving the implementation of energy eﬃciency at the local urban scale. We
demonstrate how local authorities are faced with constraining barriers that can inhibit the implementation of
centrally issued targets and policies. These barriers may even undermine local performance in the pursuit of
ambitious energy eﬃciency goals, resulting in potentially harmful consequences.
1. Introduction
Cities worldwide are currently estimated to use 75% of the world's
energy and contribute to 70% of the global energy-related greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions from fossil fuel usage (Baeumler et al., 2012;
Hillman and Ramaswami, 2010). In China, rapid economic growth and
urbanisation have turned the country into the largest carbon emitter
worldwide (IEA, 2013). Both phenomena are built on the foundation of
fossil fuel usage, with coal and petroleum accounting for more than
80% of China's energy consumption in 2012 (EIA, 2015). As a
consequence, signiﬁcant environmental and health impacts are emer-
ging, especially in urban areas (e.g., Liu et al., 2016). Moreover, at
present less than one percent of China's 500 largest cities meet World
Health Organisation (WHO) air quality standards (Liu et al., 2014;
Zhang and Crooks, 2012). As illustrated by the example of China, cities
are seen as vital research cases for energy transitions (Rotmans et al.,
2001). It is research that means to understand how cities contribute to
the development of sustainable urban energy systems characterised by
renewable energy resources and eﬃcient energy use (Droege, 2011).
In response to these pressures, the Chinese central government has
set ambitious targets to be achieved by 2020: (1) a reduction of CO2
emissions per unit of GDP by 40–45% relative to 2005 levels, and (2)
an increase of up to 15% in the non-fossil energy share of total primary
energy consumption (State Council, 2009). A number of diﬀerent
energy policies have been introduced by the central government with
the aim of reaching these objectives. In this paper we will investigate
the Chinese energy eﬃciency policy framework, which is central to
Chinese energy transition policy making. The implementation and
attainment of energy eﬃciency targets at a local level is compulsory,
and is steered top-down by the central government. The central
government issued compulsory energy eﬃciency targets in the 11th
(2006) and the 12th (2011) Five-Year-Plan (FYP): Energy intensity,
measured as CO2 emissions per unit of GDP, should decrease by 20%
between 2006 and 2010 (State Council, 2006) and by a further 16%
during the 12th FYP (2011–2015) (State Council, 2011a). The central
government's conﬁdence was high when these mandatory energy
intensity targets were translated to top-down implementation schemes
for lower levels of government and were supported by a strict
conformance-based measuring system to validate implementation at
a local level. Xu Shaoshi, Minister of China's National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC), stressed the strict implementation
regime during the 8th session of the 12th National People's Congress
(NPC) Standing Committee saying: “we need to keep pushing energy
eﬃciency policies with an ‘iron hand’ to ensure these binding targets
are achieved” (NPC, 2014).
The strict energy targets and strong adherence thus far to pushing
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with an ‘iron-hand’ regarding implementation, have resulted in creative
but also rather problematic implementations at the local scale. To
illustrate: in 2010 the local government of Anping County cut oﬀ water
and electricity supplies in residential neighbourhoods, forcing hospitals
to shut down health-care one day per week, and traﬃc lights to be
switched oﬀ, to ensure that policy goals were met in the ﬁnal year of the
11th FYP (China Greentech Report, 2013). Such extreme measures
arise from local authorities feeling compelled to meet national FYP
targets at any cost. The result is a real risk that the current use of strict
central targets and top-down implementation will overlook the inter-
relatedness of energy systems with other local societal systems by
forcing local authorities to comply with an a-priori prioritisation of
energy targets above possible other essential local needs. In the
meantime, academic research has convincingly shown that shifting to
a sustainable energy system is a complex process involving multiple
societal changes, ranging from economic and behavioural change, to
the development of new technologies and the consideration of spatial
changes (Kemp and Loorbach, 2006; Scrase and Mackerron, 2009).
Energy production from renewables, for instance, requires much more
space than production from fossil sources (Sijmons and Van Dorst,
2012). Another issue is that households, companies, trade associations,
and other social organisations will have to alter their prevailing
attitudes and responses towards new energy systems (Andrews-
Speed, 2012). In eﬀect, both a large variety of activities and actors
have to be involved in the shift to a more sustainable energy system.
These actors and stakeholders vary in their aspirations, visions, wishes,
perceptions, and knowledge and may thus generate tensions and
conﬂicts between policy priorities, notably at the local scale where
diverse aspects need to be balanced (e.g., de Boer and Zuidema, 2015;
Wüstenhagen et al., 2007).
Clearly then, energy issues do not occur in isolation, but are
interrelated with other local issues, policy ambitions and stakeholder
interests that collectively inﬂuence policy development and implemen-
tation. As such, shifting to a sustainable energy system within a local
realm is ideally based on an understanding of the interrelatedness of
energy systems with the local socio-economic and physical circum-
stances (e.g., de Boer and Zuidema, 2015). Such an understanding can
be diﬃcult to translate into centralised policy formats and initiatives,
as these tend to be less capable of responding to various unique and
detailed local circumstances and stakeholder interests (e.g., Burström
and Korhonen, 2001; De Vries, 2000; Zuidema, 2017). Instead, it
seems sensible to at least allow local authorities some ﬂexibility in
implementing central policies so as to respond to speciﬁc local
circumstances and stakeholder interests (e.g., Matland, 1995). Such
ﬂexibility seems especially relevant when policies mean to impact
highly diﬀerent localities, such as in China. China is a large country and
local circumstances vary greatly across diﬀerent regions, including
diﬀerences in resources used, geography, demography, and the social-
economic status and related structure of the economy. Although the
Chinese energy eﬃciency policy framework does take some varying
local circumstances into account by assigning localities diﬀerent
targets, it remains unclear if the framework allows for ﬂexibility in
the face of the highly diﬀerent Chinese localities. Our ambition is to
investigate how the Chinese energy eﬃciency policy framework func-
tions when applied under very diﬀerent local circumstances.
Our research departs from previous studies concerning the im-
plementation of Chinese energy eﬃciency policy. Some of these studies
examined what actions and measures were employed by local autho-
rities to conform with state planning mandates (e.g. Kostka and Hobbs,
2012; Zhang et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2014). Others paid attention to
interpreting the phenomenon of policy implementation gaps (e.g., Lo,
2014a, 2014b; Wang, 2012). Nevertheless, these previous studies have
predominantly zeroed in on one particular area, especially in energy-
intensive and industrialised regions such as Shanxi province and
Changchun city. Hence, they are only oﬀering limited information
about how the Chinese energy eﬃciency policy framework functions
under diﬀerent local circumstances. Furthermore, these studies focus
on identifying reasons for poor implementation of energy eﬃciency by
speciﬁcally addressing the rigid, top-down target allocation system in
China (Kostka, 2015; Zhao and Wu, 2016). They pay less attention to
the way in which implementation is evaluated and localities are held
accountable. International studies on policy implementation have
shown that evaluating policy success need not just be about controlling
conforming to targets, but might also assess how the targets inﬂuenced
the actual work or performance of implementing authorities within
diﬀerent contexts (e.g., Oliveira and Pinho, 2010). Moreover, perfor-
mance oriented evaluation has rarely been discussed in Chinese
academic debates (e.g. Tian and Shen, 2011). Therefore, we will
investigate the Chinese energy eﬃciency policy framework to under-
stand how policy design on both target setting and evaluation is
impacting and driving the implementation at the local scale.
Next, in Section 2 we introduce and discuss the notions of
conformance and performance in relation to policy implementation.
This discussion serves as background for the analysis of the Chinese
policy framework on energy eﬃciency in Section 3. In Section 4 we
introduce our methodology, which investigates how four diﬀerent
Chinese city municipalities have responded to national energy eﬃ-
ciency policies. In Section 5 we discuss the coping mechanisms of these
municipalities with the energy eﬃciency policies and bottlenecks that
local governments are suﬀering from. There is a reﬂection on the
Chinese approach in our concluding Section 6, where we argue for
increased ﬂexibility in both of the targets set by the central state as well
as the system of measuring policy success so as to promote an
improved performance towards reaching energy eﬃciency targets.
2. Conceptual discussion related to policy implementation
Up until the 1970s, policy implementation was rarely on the agenda
of policy scientists (e.g., O’Toole, 2000; Schoﬁeld, 2001). Instead it was
largely assumed, with a high degree of certainty, that well-designed
plans and policies would deliver their objectives. Starting with authors
such as Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) and Derthick (1972), it
became increasingly clear that policy implementation proved to be
much less evident in practice than had been previously expected. A rich
academic debate grew apace (e.g., Goggin, 1990), prominently featur-
ing studies on balancing the desire for eﬀective top-down policy
delivery in the local realm with the desire to allow for locally sensible
policy responses (e.g., Elmore, 1979; Matland, 1995; Sabatier et al.,
1986). These studies demonstrate that degrees of local discretion in
dealing with centrally stated policy ambitions indeed depend on a
combination of policy design and policy evaluation.
Local discretion is ﬁrstly inﬂuenced by how central policy ambitions
are expressed and assumed to be translated across multiple tiers of
government. As was explained by scholars, such as Elmore (1979) and
Sabatier (1986), central policies can allow for diﬀerent degrees of
diﬀerentiation based on variations in local circumstances. At one
extreme, central policy ambitions are generic with each lower level of
authority being expected to meet the same uniform targets.
Alternatively, central policy ambitions can also be diﬀerentiated with
diﬀerent localities being expected to deliver diﬀerent targets based on
diﬀerent local circumstances. In both cases policy implementation
remains top-down, but in the latter case it is sensitive to knowledge of
the detailed local circumstances. Acquiring such knowledge can,
however, be problematic for central governments (Burström and
Korhonen, 2001; De Vries, 2000; Fleurke and Hulst, 2006), thus
implying that diﬀerentiation in targets might fail to suﬃciently take
local circumstances into acount. Consequently, it is also possible to
allow for some ﬂexibility in central ambitions itself, as discussed by
Matland (1995) and Sabatier (1986). Central policy ambitions can then
be stated in more strategic or ambiguous terms in order to allow for
modiﬁcations to these policies as they get translated to lower levels of
authority (e.g., DeLeon and DeLeon, 2002; Yanow, 1998). In this way,
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local circumstances are able to directly inﬂuence the development of
local policies in a context of centrally stated policy ambitions.
This discussion of target setting also brings us to the ways in which
central governments evaluate policy implementation as is expressed
with the diﬀerence between conformance and performance (e.g.,
Mastop and Faludi, 1997; Oliveira and Pinho, 2010). To date, the
research on policy implementation in relation to policy evaluation in
China has received limited attention. As Tian and Shen, p.11 (2011)
state, “… there has been few publications addressing the evaluation of
plan implementation”. A strong focus of existing studies has been on
the instrumental use of disparate evaluation criteria on conformance
and performance to assess plan implementation, such as in land use
(e.g., Zhong et al., 2014). However, a conceptual discussion through the
lens of conformance and performance to understand policy implemen-
tation has been lacking. This discussion would also provide an
alternative perspective to reﬂect on the Chinese strategy on energy
eﬃciency.
Conformance follows a straight, linear logic between policy intent
and policy outcomes (Faludi and Altes, 1994) and assumes a direct
one-to-one relationship where outcomes of policies should directly
support the objectives, intent and measures expressed in a plan or
policy. Therefore, conformance essentially assumes that policy success
depends on whether consequences in practice are consistent with
policy-makers’ initial plan. Alternatively, ‘performance’ shifts our
attention to what happens with the policy (Faludi, 2000) or plan and
whether plans ‘facilitate decision-making’ (Faludi, 1989, p.138).
Performance considers plans, policies and even targets as a guide for
future decisions and emphasises the planning processes that occur
after the initial plans and policies are adopted (Alexander and Faludi,
1989; Baer, 1997; Mastop and Faludi, 1997). Instead of conformance
to stated ambitions and targets per se, performance focuses on the
process of ‘getting something done’ (Macleod and By, 2007, p. 335). In
this approach, outcomes do not need to adhere strictly to ambitions
and targets set. Instead, success is deﬁned by the degrees to which
implementers have actively engage with these ambitions and targets,
including how they ‘perform’ within a context of both the targets and
the detailed circumstances they face. Modiﬁcations to these ambitions
and targets are then permissible and possibly desirable. The idea being
that practice needs to be adaptive to an ever-changing and situational
environment, that is confronted with many uncertainties and conﬂicts,
whilst also loosely coupled within societal institutional settings
(Laurian et al., 2004). Therefore, as de Roo, p.118(2003) argues, “the
performance of decision-making is a phenomenon in planning that
clearly derives from a growing recognition of the role and position of
actors in various institutional contexts”. Performance thus highlights
situational contexts and sees planning issues as strongly interwoven
within local institutional contexts.
The choice between a strict top-down, conformance-oriented policy
design and a more ﬂexible bottom-up, performance-oriented policy
design can be connected with conditions of complexity. de Roo (2003)
argues that policy conformance is most suitable if the issues and
circumstances faced are of limited complexity. Such issues and
circumstances are characterised by relatively straightforward, clear
cause-and-eﬀect relationships and where there is little societal debate
on the objectives to pursue and the interventions to take (see also
Christensen, 1985; Zuidema, 2017). Under such circumstances con-
formance to ambitions and targets seems not only feasible, but is also
considered as widely accepted. Supported by strong top-down and
‘command and control’ policy design, conformance is now often
preferably used as an evaluation criterion so as to ensure that dictated
objectives are achieved (Brody and Highﬁeld, 2005; Macleod and By,
2007).
When conditions of complexity increase, cause and eﬀect relation-
ships become increasingly ‘fuzzy’ and there are usually multiple,
interdependent and potentially conﬂicting goals needed to be pursued
(e.g., Christensen, 1985; de Roo, 2003; Zuidema, 2017). Moreover,
participating actors, available resources, problems and potential solu-
tion strategies will diﬀer according to speciﬁc local circumstances (see
also Cohen et al., 1972). Under these circumstances it becomes
attractive to balance alternative local interests and priorities based on
how they are locally interrelated and context-dependent. Pursuing
policy targets set a-priori to such balancing can be problematic, as it
fails to take such interdependencies and contextual circumstances into
account. Policies drafted a-priori can be commonly seen in a Chinese
governance system. For example, Liu et al. (2012) show how Chinese
environmental governance approaches “make local governments meet
speciﬁc targets but ignore other environmental challenges. It creates
institutional lock-in where only some urgent environmental challenges
are addressed, while complex social-ecological changes can always
generate new challenges” (p. 108). Thus, adopting a top-down and
command-and-control policy approach with strict, centrally issued
targets and compliance-based policy evaluation not only seems to be
less eﬀective but also less desirable. Instead, issues would ideally be
dealt with by also allowing for a bottom-up and area-speciﬁc approach,
which considers local circumstances and the interrelations between
various interests and priorities (de Roo et al., 2012). However, with
performance, it is the explicit intent to allow ambitions and targets to
be translated within a context of local situational circumstances and to
become more tailor-made to unique local contexts. Thus, performance-
based evaluation is now attractive as it also deﬁnes a plan or policy as a
learning process (Oliveira and Pinho, 2010) and emphasises the
suitability of a plan where decision-making should be adapted to the
surrounding contexts.
Obviously, degrees of conformance and performance oriented
policy evaluation can be mixed, where both meeting targets whilst
respecting local circumstances can be combined (e.g. Matland, 1995;
O’Toole, 2000). Current Chinese practice remains strongly focused on
conformance oriented evaluation and is reliant on top-down and
command-and-control approaches (e.g., Tian and Shen, 2011).
Pursuing energy eﬃciency will certainly aﬀect pursuing other local
policy priorities and the exact interrelations between energy eﬃciency
and these priorities will also be diﬀerent given the vast diﬀerences in
local circumstances across China. Hence, focusing largely on confor-
mance might well pose a risk within the current design of the Chinese
energy eﬃciency policy framework.
Firstly, top-down target setting may fail to be sensitive to wide
variations between cities, especially as the central government might
not have the available knowledge of local diﬀerences to set the ‘right’
targets (Kostka, 2015). Secondly, the conformance-oriented policy
evaluation might even aggravate problems and could force local
authorities to prioritise the superimposed targets (e.g., energy eﬃ-
ciency) at the expense of other policy priorities (e.g., spatial, environ-
ment, social, economic, etc.). The adverse consequences regarding one
of these other priorities might even become extreme, as the example of
Anping County vividly illustrates. Finally, a focus on only conformance
could possibly overlook actual local performance. For example, a city
that does not conform to targets may still have made impressive
improvements despite diﬃcult local circumstances, whilst a city that
does conform may have made fewer improvements and instead be
beneﬁting from favourable local circumstances. Hence, a conformance
perspective might fail to neither capture what has actually happened
locally nor place local action beyond the frame of conformance. In our
discussion of the empirical ﬁndings in Section 5, we will also show that
each of these three issues is indeed relevant for understanding and
evaluating China's energy eﬃciency policy framework.
3. An urban energy transition strategy in Chinese central
government
In China, energy intensity is a measure used in policies to estimate
and assess energy eﬃciency at the national macro level, by relating the
units of energy to the unit of GDP (Price et al., 2011, 2010). Energy
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eﬃciency essentially implies using less energy in a system for perform-
ing the same function (Oikonomou et al., 2009). Various scholars
advise that measuring energy eﬃciency based on energy intensity data
can be misleading (Kapusuzoglu and Karan, 2013; Proskuryakova and
Kovalev, 2015) because: “Energy intensity does not provide a basis for
speciﬁc recommendations on energy eﬃciency development…and the
direct outcome of decreasing energy intensity is decoupling economic
growth from energy consumption…such decoupling does not necessa-
rily result in achieving ultimate energy eﬃciency” (Proskuryakova and
Kovalev, 2015, p. 458).
To achieve its energy intensity targets, the Chinese central govern-
ment has developed a variety of national policies. The strongly
hierarchical administrative system leaves little room for deviations
from top-down issued targets. Hence, there is only limited room to
negotiate targets between diﬀerent levels of government or at the local
level between local energy departments and other local policy depart-
ments or stakeholders (Qi, 2013). The Action Plan on Energy
Eﬃciency and Low-carbon Development (2014–2015) (State
Council, 2014), and other sectoral energy eﬃciency policies (i.e. for
industry, building and transport) present good examples of this model.
Our document analysis of current Chinese national energy eﬃ-
ciency policies and regulations shows that these are strongly technical
and standardised.1 They provide clear details on speciﬁc quantitative
targets that the lower levels of authority need to meet. Such concrete
targets in the 12th FYP period, for example, dictate the speciﬁc
reduction of main pollutants in air (SO2, −8%; NOx, −10%) and water
(NH4, −10%); and the speciﬁc energy intensity reduction in railways
(−15%), commercial vehicles (−5%), and the aviation industry (−5%)
(MOT, 2011). Other savings are to be realised in a 116 Mtce reduction
of energy use in public buildings (MOHURD, 2012); more small fossil
fuel-ﬁred power plants needing to be shut down; and strict restriction
standards being put in place for high energy consumption products,
covering appliances related to lighting, heating and cooling. These
national targets are mandatory for lower tiers of government. The
energy eﬃciency targets do show some variation inspired by diﬀerent
regional circumstances. Nevertheless, variation arguably remains mod-
est, focused only on provinces and with the 31 provinces classiﬁed into
only ﬁve tiers (Table 1).
The exact allocation of municipal targets and the evaluation of policy
implementation are based on the ‘Target Responsibility System (TRS)’.
Rules of TRS mainly include (1) allocating ﬁxed mandatory targets for
lower-level authorities, stepwise, from national to provincial (see
Table 1) and from provincial to municipal and county levels (Fig. 1);
(2) signing ‘Target Responsibility Contracts’ layer by layer between
upper administrative level governments, their subordinate authorities
and key energy-consuming enterprises; and (3) evaluating the imple-
mentation outcomes on whether the required targets are met. Most
importantly, the TRS dictates that local oﬃcials and enterprise leaders
have to be held accountable for the implementation results: achieving
the targets is a matter of importance for local leaders, who are assessed
annually on their political presentation, and can be key to their political
careers (Lo, 2014b; Zhao et al., 2014). The direct target ‘delivering’ and
‘accountability’ system is therefore a powerful incentive and a signiﬁcant
tool for compelling oﬃcials at each governmental level to conform to
targets, instructions or policies issued by the central government (also
Wang, 2012). Fig. 1 indicates that each government at a higher level can
directly translate targets to subordinate authorities, while local govern-
ments are mainly responsible for implementing and reaching them.
Next to target setting, the TRS evaluation framework sets proce-
dures, rewards and penalties into quantiﬁable variables (State Council,
2007). Those variables are then translated into a nationwide scoring
system to hold local authorities accountable according to a centrally
decided benchmark. Lower level governments are allowed to add
elements to this evaluation scheme, but they must also remain within
the reference of the central government issued system. This means that
local authorities can add stricter measures to guarantee that targets are
successfully reached in addition to having to comply with the two state-
issued evaluation criteria of ‘Target-Checking’ and ‘Action-Checking’
(Table 2). ‘Target-Checking’ assesses the compliance to allocated
targets and comprises 40% of the total score. The remaining 60%
corresponds to the second criterion, referred to as ‘Action-Checking’
(State Council, 2007). Here, local governments are assessed on how
they followed mandatory tasks in order to reach their energy eﬃciency
improvements. Examples of such measures include establishing and
implementing an energy benchmarking system, monitoring energy
consumption for lower-level governments, and having critical enter-
prises meet given targets (Table 2).
To some extent, ‘Action-Checking’ seems to capture local perfor-
mance. After all, it is not directly interested in meeting the target, but
rather in ‘getting things done’. However, as Lo indicates, these actions
are largely focused on organisational tasks and “are symbolic, can be
easily achieved, and are not directly related to the implementation of
low-carbon policies” (2014a, p. 241). Even if ‘Action-Checking’ was to
be seen to capture performance, the most important aspect of the TRS
is that ‘Target-Checking’ is designated as a ‘veto criterion’, which
means that if assigned targets are not met (non-conformance), policy
implementation will always be evaluated as failed. Conformance is thus
crucial for municipalities in gaining further state support and for the
future career paths of local oﬃcials and enterprise leaders. This does
not mean that ‘Action-Checking’ is of no relevance. In the case of
conformance, a higher overall score increases the likelihood of cities to
attract additional provincial or state support and opens opportunities
for local leaders to be promoted. Also, in the case of non-conformance,
a higher overall score might act as a buﬀer to reduce state or provincial
pressure and negative impact on future careers. Still, what stands out is
that the score received is much less relevant than meeting the targets.
Even if we regard the score received as representing performance,
conformance is still the main driver for local action.
4. Case and methods
The research presented here follows a qualitative case study
approach: the four case study cities have been selected to cover a
broad diversity of diﬀerent urban conditions such as resource distribu-
tion, population size, industrial structure, and economic development.
The diversity of urban conditions is intended to investigate whether the
cities exhibit diﬀerent responses and coping mechanisms based on
Table 1
Provincial allocated energy intensity reduction targets in the 12th FYP period.
Source: State Council (2011a); NDRC (2015).
Target Provinces Provinces missing
targets (until
November 2015)
18% Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang,
Guangdong
–
17% Beijing, Hebei, Liaoning, Shandong –
16% Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui,
Fujian, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Sichuan,
Shannxi, Hunan, Chongqing
–
15% Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Guizhou,
Yunan, Gansu, Ningxia
Ningxia
10% Hainan, Tibet, Qinghai, Xinjiang Xinjiang, Hainan, Qinghai
1 These include: 11th FYP Medium and long-term plan for energy conservation
(NDRC, 2004); Comprehensive work plan for energy conservation and emission
reduction for the 12th FYP period (State Council, 2011a); 12th FYP Energy conservation
and emission reduction (State Council, 2012); Action plan on energy eﬃciency and low-
carbon development (2014–2015) (State Council, 2014); 12th FYP Building energy
conversation plan (MOHURD, 2012); 12th FYP Road and water transportation
conversation plan (MOT, 2011).
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Fig. 1. Energy-intensity target setting and translation process during the 12th FYP period.
Source: according to Li et al. (2013).
Table 2
TRS – Target responsibility system sets a national scoring framework for energy intensity.
Source: State Council (2007).
Criteria Contents Scores Details
Target-Checking
(40%)
Reduction in Energy consumption per
unit GDP
40 40 points for meeting the target, 36 if finished 90%; 32 if finished 80%; 28 if finished 70%; 24 if
finished 60%; 20 if finished 50%; no points below 50%. 3 extra points for exceeding the target by
10%, maximum 9 extra points. If not 100% (40 points), the overall evaluation will be ‘fail’
Action-Checking
(60%)
Adjust and optimise industrial
structure
20 • Increase the share of the tertiary industry (4 points)
• Expanding high-tech industry (4 points)
• Evaluating energy conservation in ﬁxed assets investment projects (4 points)
• Achieving the annual targets of closing down backward production projects (8 points)
Financial investment and key projects
implementation
10 • Setting up a special fund for energy conservation (3 points)
• Increasing the proportion of expenditure on energy conservation (4 points)
• Implementing major energy conservation projects (3 points)
Technology investment and use 9 • Including energy conservation technologies into annual technology development plan (2 points)
• Increasing the expenditure of developing energy conservation technologies (3 points)
• Implementing energy conservation demonstration projects (2 points)
• Promoting energy-saving products and technologies (2 points)
Energy intensity reduction in key
enterprises
8 • Achieving the energy reduction targets of key energy-intensive enterprises (3 points)
• Monitoring energy intensity reduction in key enterprises (1 point)
• Achieving the targets of implementing energy-saving standards for new buildings (4 points)
Law and regulation implementation 3 • Implementing energy saving law (1 point)
• Monitoring law implementation (1 point)
• Implementing limiting standards for energy-intensive products (1 point)
Target Allocation 3 • Allocating targets to lower levels of government (1 point)
• Evaluating target attainment in energy reduction (1 point)
• Publishing energy consumption statistics (1point)
Rewards and penalties 5 • Capacity building (1 point)
• Improving energy statistics system(1 point)
• Implementing training system (1 point)
• Reward and penalty system (1 point)
• Equipping energy measuring instrument (1 point)
Coordination and monitoring ability 2 • Setting up an evaluation and monitoring system (1 point)
• Setting up a coordination working mechanism (1 point)
Total 100
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their particular context and conditions. (Fig. 2).
Lanzhou (population: 3.61 million and Hohhot (population: 2.86
million) are located in the north west of the territory. Both cities are
economically underdeveloped areas and are still heavily reliant on the
traditional industrial model of high energy demand (e.g., coal, petro-
leum and gas). They are providing electricity and industrial materials
for other Chinese areas. For example, over one-third of the annual
power supply generated from fossil fuels in Inner Mongolia (where
Hohhot is located) is exported to other regions, especially to the higher
developed China East coast (Liu, 2015). Liu (2015) noted that carbon
intensity in such fossil-rich provinces is generally over ﬁve times higher
than in developed economic regions. Striving hard for increasing the
GDP, both cities are challenged to balance the GDP goal with the goal
of reducing energy intensity.
Yangzhou (population: 4.4 million), is located in the economically
strong eastern part of the country. Its strong economic development is
depending on resources from fossil-rich areas in China. Statistical data
shows that 96.5% coil, 90% oil and 54.3% gas are extra-regionally
supplied (Yangzhou New Energy Model City Plan, 2012). In diﬀerent
policies and strategies the city commits to the goal of reducing its
energy intensity and its external dependency on fossil-fuel. Chengdu
(population: 14.4 million) is located in mid-west China. Chengdu's
economic performance is based on the service sector, which already
surpassed the industry sector in 2013 (Chengdu Statistical Yearbook,
2014). Chengdu is rich in natural gas and coal resources and is thus
comparatively self-suﬃcient regarding its energy supply.
The research is based on a document and policy analysis including
legal documents, reports and Chinese research reports.2 In parallel, an
explorative focus group at a workshop in China was conducted for an
initial screening (China Decentralized Energy System, 22–25th
December 2014, Guangzhou). The policy analysis and initial screening
formed the basis for the case study selection and the development of
the interview guidelines for the semi-structured interviews. 25 inter-
views were conducted at the on-site ﬁeldwork in November and
December 2015 in the four case study cities: Lanzhou (6 interviews)
Yangzhou (6), Chengdu (5) and Hohhot (5). Three interviews were
conducted in National Governments and in the National Renewable
Energy Research Institute in Beijing. The interviews include 16 with
diﬀerent levels of government (national, provincial, municipal, district)
and diﬀerent departments that are occupied with energy related
matters (Departments of Energy, Resources and Environmental
Protection, Planning, Industrial, and Economy); 5 with academic
scholars; and 4 with project managers of energy enterprises. The
interviews were transcribed and a qualitative content analysis was
performed with ATLAS.ti (Mayring, 2015).
5. Does that work? Bottlenecks and implementation
ineﬃciencies at the local urban scale
In this section we identify responses and coping mechanisms
present in the case study cities. We use the perspective outlined in
Section 2 to illustrate the case study cities’ approaches to cope with the
national energy intensity policies.
5.1. Target setting
During the period of the 12th FYP, the four case study cities
received the following mandatory targets for reducing their energy
intensity (Table 3): Lanzhou, 17%; Hohhot, 16%; Chengdu, 16%;
Yangzhou, 17%. It can be seen that only minor diﬀerences exist in
target setting although major diﬀerences exist regarding the general
local conditions and economic viability. To help local governments to
achieve given targets, the Chinese central government provided a series
of speciﬁc measures and tasks that were detailed in the 12th FYP
Energy conservation and emission reduction (State Council, 2012).
These tasks were compulsory and local governments were required to
implement them. The selected key tasks include:
• Closing down small plants and eliminating obsolete production
capacity in the areas of power generation, iron and steel, electricity,
aluminium, calcium carbide, coke, coal, cement, and ﬂat glass. For
example, the plan calls for closing 20 Gigawatts (GW) of small
thermal power generating capacity and ineﬃcient production facil-
ities responsible for 480 million tons of iron and 480 million tons of
steel capacity. In addition, inhibiting the development of high
energy-consumption industries and encouraging renewable energy
use.
• Ten key energy-saving projects: aiming to increase energy eﬃciency
through optimising their economic structure and by promoting more
energy eﬃcient technology. Initiatives including coal-ﬁred industrial
boiler retroﬁts, district cogeneration projects, petroleum conserva-
tion and substitution projects, and energy system optimisation are
described.
• Top-1000 enterprises program: central government setting clear
energy eﬃciency targets and responsibilities to China's largest
energy-consuming enterprises, which are from nine sectors such
as iron and steel, coal mining, textiles and paper.
Even though the case study cities were all regulated under national
measures, they exhibited a high level of variation in their coping
mechanisms. Our ﬁndings show that Lanzhou and Hohhot felt greater
Fig. 2. Location of the four case study municipalities.
Source: Authors.
Table 3
Reported data of energy intensity among the four case studies during the 12th FYP.
Source: Fieldwork; Inner Mongolia Gernal Oﬃce (2012); Lanzhou General Oﬃce (2011);
Jiangsu Gernal Oﬃce (2012); Sichuan General Oﬃce (2011).
Cases studied Given targets Reported target fulﬁlment
Lanzhou 17% 26.24% (over fulfilled)
Hohhot 16% 16%
Chengdu 16% 16%
Yangzhou 17% 22.1% (over fulfilled)
2 These include: Renewable Energy and Energy Eﬃciency in China: Current Status and
Prospects for 2020 (2010); Annual Review of Low-Carbon Development in China (2013);
governmental policy documents (e.g., provincial and municipal energy conservation
plans); and media reports.
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pressure, than compared to Chengdu and Yangzhou, in coping with the
above-mentioned national tasks and in meeting the given energy
intensity targets.
Economically weaker cities, like Lanzhou and Hohhot, were under
increased pressure by central government to catch up with other cities
in terms of economic growth and thus to narrow the economic gap
between themselves and the economically more advanced regions
(State Council, 2011b). Hence, next to stimulating GDP growth, the
cities also have to target energy reduction in their heavy industry based
economy. Thus, governmental oﬃcials argued that the energy policy
and targets are not reﬂecting local conditions and are in conﬂict with
local capacities and policy priorities, especially fostering revenue
growth and increasing the local GDP. Boosting GDP growth and
creating jobs are also crucial for the local leadership, because the
central government assesses the performance of the local leadership
based on those criteria. The case studies illustrate that success and
overachievement are beneﬁcial for pursuing individual career path-
ways, which aligns with work from Jia et al. (2015). Policy targets such
as job creation, GDP and revenue growth, and the improvement of local
livelihoods are rigid and compulsory national targets. Non-attainment
reduces both individual career prospects and potential political re-
wards (HUHT02, 2015).
Furthermore, the research illustrates additional local tensions
resulting from the relocation of energy intensive industry to the
western part of the country, such as Hohhot and Lanzhou. These
relocations are expressed as outcomes of two trends: (1) the national
economic policy intending to shift traditional industries to the eco-
nomically weaker areas to the west, and (2) the companies market
compliant behaviour in relocating companies to areas with cheaper
production costs: “large-scale high-energy consumption industries and
enterprises operating in developed eastern coastal areas have begun to
transfer to less-developed western and northern regions due to China's
regional economic structure adjustment” (BJ01, 2015). Subsequently,
for these cities the struggle to meet the national energy targets might
increase, but in parallel the relocations can be beneﬁcial for the goal of
GDP growth: “increasing local economy and improving people's well-
being is our top priority rather than energy reduction” (HUHT04,
2015), and “we have to grasp the opportunity of the eastern industry
transferring so as to speed up local economy” (LZ03, 2015). However,
those developments might lead to local tensions: whilst national targets
require shutting down energy intense and technically out-dated facil-
ities, these cities still canvass low-eﬃciency industries and out-dated
technological facilities with lower energy and environmental standards.
Local representatives are arguing that companies facilitating that kind
of technology were, and are, major taxpayers that should be supported.
Furthermore, the local governments do not have the ﬁnancial capacity
to subsidise these companies to update their technical standards
(HUHT01, 2015). Finally, these two cities are additionally burdened
with extra energy expenditures to transfer the energy to economically
better-developed areas such as Yangzhou. This is caused by the fact
that the energy needed to transport fuel goes on the account of the
production area while the consuming area goes free.
Despite already moving towards a service industry, Chengdu's
industrialisation level is still somewhere in between the eastern and
western regions (Chengdu Scientiﬁc Development Report, 2013).
Although with less pressure compared to western cities, local govern-
mental oﬃcials are still challenged to achieve energy targets: “this
industrial structure optimisation is a rather long-term, slow and
complex process, which involves local stakeholders’ various interests”
(CD01, 2015). However, energy reduction targets have to be strictly
met within the given time, therefore “we worried about that if we push
the agenda of optimisation too hard or too fast, it could aﬀect social
stability, employment and even GDP growth” (CD01, 2015).
In cities with strong tensions between GDP growth and attaining
energy targets the need to conform to both can cause dubious last-
minute practices during oﬃcial inspections. Examples include the
temporary reduction of energy consumption or even shutting down
high-energy industries during such oﬃcial inspections. These are then
re-opened once inspections have passed. “Poorly adapted energy
targets and strict evaluation force us to show compliance by whatever
measures” (LZ01, 2015). However, similar strategies also occurred in
more economically advanced cities like Chengdu: Being easy in general
but tight when inspection comes. More speciﬁcally, the government
assisted to approve and operate energy-consuming projects at the
beginning of the year, while once the time came to evaluate the targets,
the local authority required ‘unfavourable’ factories related to steel,
petrochemical industries to slow or stop production (CD02, 2015).
GDPism may meet with little local government enthusiasm and
motivation to push the energy eﬃciency policy implementation for-
ward. Especially since the relational measure of energy intensity does
not convey actual energy reduction and policy performance.
Cities like Yangzhou (high-tech industry) and, to some degree, also
Chengdu (service industry) show slightly diﬀerent responses to Hohhot
and Lanzhou due to their diﬀerent economic context. They have
transferred much of their heavy industries to other locations and,
combined with a slowing down of their economic growth, they are
experiencing a decrease in energy consumption (YZ02, 2015).
Compared to the aforementioned two cities, Yangzhou has less
pressure in meeting targets for reducing energy intensity. It has
achieved a certain stage of industrialisation characterised by shifting
to high-tech industries and a modern service industry while the
extensive development of heavy industries has slowed down (YZ02,
2015). Consequently, the required tasks and targets, such as closing
down small plants and phasing out obsolete production capacity, are
relatively easy to implement and achieve. It can even result in them
surpassing the national targets.
Target setting by central government has been adapted between the
11th and 12th FYP (Zhao and Wu, 2016) and thus a shift took place
from a generic 20% reduction during the 11th FYP to a more nuanced
scheme in the 12th FYP (Table 1). The cases nevertheless illustrate a
certain level of insensitivity in target setting: economic powerhouses
with strong GDP growth rates and already changing industrial struc-
tures (such as Yangzhou) have to attain more ambitious targets than
cities that are energy producing and rely on heavy industry for GDP
growth (such as Hohhot or Lanzhou). Their coping mechanisms may
reﬂect the potential problems arising from the present method of
setting targets in Chinese energy intensity management. The top-down
and relatively generic target setting approach focuses exclusively on
attaining energy targets without inquiring into whether these targets
provide suﬃcient incentives in more advanced cities. Furthermore,
these targets are pursued regardless of whether or not they are realistic
in the face of local circumstances in other cities. Consequently, these
targets tend to conﬂict with policy priorities that local scale authorities
also have to meet, such as their economy and employment circum-
stances. Policy conﬂicts are general and global phenomena, but the
research illustrates speciﬁcs for the Chinese context: (a) GDPism: the
goal to boost the GDP results in energy intensity targets being regarded
as less crucial, (b) Career prospects: increasing GDP is a key criteria for
individual career prospects and political career pathways, and (c) what
matters is the goal attainment and policy conformance, not the actions
or the process how the goal was achieved. Since non-conformance to
energy intensity targets have (personal) political and ﬁnancial con-
sequences, cities resort to extreme and unreasonable measures to show
their compliance with the given decisions. Consequently, the centra-
lised system does not encourage, and even discourages, active engage-
ment at local levels to smartly balance local multiple interests.
5.2. Bottlenecks in the evaluation of the policy implementation
As shown in Table 2, the current target measuring system consists
of two main evaluation frameworks: Target-Checking (40%) and
Action-Checking (60%). Target-Checking measures only the reduction
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of energy intensity whereas Action-Checking oﬀers a range of diﬀerent
actions and measures to achieve policy goals.
5.2.1. Target-checking
The key component of the TRS is the targeted reduction of energy
intensity, which is a veto criterion of the evaluation scheme. NDRC
data indicates that, until November 2015, only 4 out of 31 provinces
did not achieve the energy intensity targets during the 12th FYP
(NDRC, 2015). In reaching an overall success rate of 90%, with some
localities even over-performing (see Tables 1, 3), the policy implemen-
tation could be considered a major success. Such over-achievement, as
seen in Lanzhou and Yangzhou, is beneﬁcial because it increases the
chances to obtain rewards and additional funding from the central
government, like the low-carbon city pilot project. Receiving such
rewards encourages cities to raise their reputation to attract new
investors and business ventures to their cities, and subsequently
supports the job market and the core policy goal of GDP growth.
However, a more critical reading of the case study results could also
indicate that the high success rates are a consequence of less ambitious
goal setting due to less successful policy implementation during the
previous FYP period, aligning with the work by (Lo, 2014a). Our case
study results align with the work of Ran (2013), showing that creative
data handling, downplaying failures, exaggeration of achievements and
prettiﬁcation of single actions and measures are common ground when
it comes to target checking: “it is impossible to meet all the given
targets, so we have to take whatever actions that can help us showing
conformance” (LZ04, 2015). Our case study respondents argued that
their imperative has been to stick to these given targets, at least to show
compliance to higher levels of government, as the strict compliance-
based evaluation directly aﬀects the overall government's reputation
and individual career prospects (CD02, 2015).
All four cases indicate that the tensions between career prospects,
improving city reputation, GDP growth, and achieving national energy
goals might lead to a somewhat creative approach regarding data
management and analysis. The lack of a coherent standard for
measuring energy intensity, along with ineﬀective energy statistic
monitoring systems, creates an action space for the cities to facilitate
the most promising methods to present results conﬁrming policy
conformance. Additionally, non-standardised data collection, and in-
complete and mismatched data regarding industrial energy intensity,
forces the cities to base calculations on whatever data they have
available. For example, not every industrial enterprise can provide its
exact energy consumption data, which leads to the data collected being
rather selective. This mismatch exacerbates careful monitoring, adap-
tation and policy learning: “(…) the serious mismatch of statistical data
between national and local governments has turned energy conserva-
tion into a high-pressure situation.” (NDRC, 2013). As a consequence,
deciding on conformance and performance might well become more a
matter of (political) choice and interpretation than that of showing
evidence.
5.2.2. Performance-oriented action checking
Action-Checking (60 points) is the performance-oriented counter-
part to Target-Checking in the policy evaluation system. While Target-
Checking focuses on the conformance with explicit goals, cities can
collect further points by performing diﬀerent actions in line with
national energy intensity policies (Table 2). The local oﬃcials inter-
viewed perceive the Action-Checking part as an easy assignment.
Firstly, if Target-Checking is achieved, Action-Checking is merely a
less urgent matter of collecting additional points to move up the ‘leader
board’. Secondly, many actions are only remotely and indirectly linked
to energy conservation, whilst they are also comparatively easy to
attain to score points. Hence, meeting actions can support local
oﬃcials’ political careers, whilst only moderately pushing them to
perform on energy intensity reductions.
As illustrated in the previous section, some cases including
Lanzhou, Hohhot and Chengdu achieved the energy intensity targets
by taking dubious measures. These measures helped local authorities to
easily meet the targets and show their conformance to national
mandates, and thus the improper implementation process can be
easily overlooked. Another example also shows the ﬂaws of the current
conformance-oriented policy evaluation. The measure of energy in-
tensity merges economic prosperity and energy reduction, and there-
fore indicates the general performance and economic growth of the
region:
“At the end of each year, the upper-level governments measure
whether the exact target of energy intensity is achieved. Once you
know how to play the game, target achieving will not be hard. For
example, as long as GDP increases quicker than energy consump-
tion, energy intensity will show a decrease. The policy implementa-
tion will then be seen as successful; however, we did not make too
much eﬀort on reducing energy usage” (CD03, 2015).
Hence, policy success can be achieved by pushing economic growth
whilst performance in the initial policy domain might be comparatively
poor. Additional cushioning eﬀects might be related to the fact that
Action-Checking performance does not compensate for weak achieve-
ments in energy reduction.
Apart from failing to capture ‘bad’ performance, the evaluation
system also seems to fail to capture some ‘good’ performances, as the
Yangzhou case clearly demonstrates. Yangzhou local government has
undertaken great eﬀorts in recent years to shift towards a sustainable
energy system. They have implemented and launched diﬀerent energy
conservation actions and measures, such as frequent on-site research,
capacity building with diﬀerent relevant stakeholders to build local
coalitions for a better embeddedness of actions, and improving social
cohesion. These actions have resulted in considerable energy conserva-
tion measures in 2014 (YZ01, 2015), for example:
• 810,000 tce renewable energy, accounting for 7% of total energy
consumption, which is above its provincial average (Jiangsu, 6.2%);
• 426 MW PV capacity for solar energy: rooftop solar water heaters in
the hospitality industry, public buildings, and residential buildings;
installed solar lighting in public areas, saved 438.5 Mwh a year.
Consequently, Yangzhou was approved by the State Council as the
‘demonstration city of renewable energy application in buildings in
China;
• Jiangsu's ﬁrst large electric vehicle charging station was installed in
Yangzhou, which now has a pure electric bus line and hybrid bus
lines;
• 30 new energy communities have installed rooftop and wall-
mounted solar water heaters, ground source heat pump cogenera-
tion, electric vehicles, and garbage biogas. All of these eﬀorts
towards energy transition make Yangzhou a ‘demonstration city of
New Energy Use in China’ (NEA, 2014).
The research illustrates that performance based actions are also
conditioned by stronger economic power and capacity (e.g. funding),
and a technological (e.g. cooperation and technological exchange) and
knowledge-based background (e.g. expertise, tech-capacity (see also
Guo, 2014)). However, those actions and measures are not assessed
nor are they well-recognised within the current conformance-based
evaluation system: “What eﬀorts we have made is hard to be demon-
strated within the current evaluation system, because the numbers
have the ﬁnal say. But, we do hope our work can be noticed and thus we
might get some ﬁnancial or technological support from the central
government” (YZ02, 2015).
In conclusion, our research shows that local governments have
developed diﬀerent response and coping strategies to achieve a
successful policy performance on paper: diﬀerent economic and
political conditions, paired with individual career interests and facil-
itating energy intensity in order to measure actual energy reduction,
J. Wu et al. Energy Policy 106 (2017) 201–211
208
indeed results in implementation deﬁciencies. It is also problematic for
central government(s) to comprehensively examine how ably policy
implementation is being carried out, especially as the ways in which
these assigned targets are to be met can easily be neglected during
policy evaluation. Consequently, negative aspects of implementation
can be concealed whereas positive eﬀects are hard to demonstrate. At
this point we can conclude that the current TRS evaluation system is
not only biased to conformance instead of performance, but is also
unable to capture the great variety of performances in the cities
studied.
6. Conclusions and policy implications
The Chinese government has drafted a broad variety of policies to
reduce energy consumption, improve environmental quality and, in
general, to stimulate a transition towards a more sustainable energy
system. In being focused on ensuring eﬀectiveness in local policy
implementation, China relies on a top-down and compliance-oriented
policy design and evaluation system. Although these top-down strate-
gies have yielded several achievements over the last decade, the
exclusive use of this approach also has drawbacks. We indeed found
some similar coping mechanisms as also identiﬁed in earlier research
(e.g., power rationing, data manipulation). What we add here are two
key points. Firstly, we have been able to show that the Chinese energy
eﬃciency policy framework's strong conformance-oriented perspective
can provoke a ‘ticking-of-the-boxes’ instead of promoting actual policy
performance. Meeting a target on paper does not necessarily mean that
it was actually met as both available data and how this data is
interpreted remains open ended. Hence, deciding on conformance
might well become more a matter of (political) choice and interpreta-
tion than that of showing evidence. Meeting targets can also be based
on measures that cannot be safely assumed to contribute to improving
energy intensity. They can be temporal or extreme, whilst economic
GDP growth can be seen as a means to create better energy intensity
ﬁgures as opposed to focusing on improved energy eﬃciency or actual
conservation itself. In other words, a strongly compliance-oriented
management only tells a very simplistic story and is not necessarily
showing actual levels of performance.
Secondly, we add that failing to really take varying local circum-
stances into account is among the causes for lower levels of perfor-
mance. In some cases, the Chinese energy eﬃciency policy framework
overlooks the hardships and extreme measures needed to meet targets
(notably in Lanzhou and Hohhot). If conformance occurred, this might
well be interpreted as a poor performance due to the extreme measures
needed. Alternatively, not reaching targets is seen as a failure, even if
the cities performed quite well but the set targets were simply
unrealistic. In other cases, the Chinese energy eﬃciency policy frame-
work overlooks relevant additional measures that could be taken to
perform better or that are actually being taken (notably in Yangzhou).
At present, the ill-adapted targets for local contexts might result in the
underperformance of cities as they are not being suﬃciently challenged
by the targets or are not being awarded by successes attained.
Whilst some authors (e.g., Liu et al., 2012; Lo et al., 2015) do argue
that conformance based targets need to increase in order to create the
necessary push factor for local governments, we suggest that decision-
makers should also embrace more ﬂexibility and adaptiveness in both
target setting and evaluation. Notably, such ﬂexibility should account
for diﬀerences between local circumstances and, by doing so, search for
a better ﬁt between strong top-down policy pressure and the type of
actions and ambitions that are feasible given such local circumstances.
In doing so, our cases illustrate the importance of a more balanced
relationship between conformance and performance oriented targets so
as to galvanise local authorities to perform in the initial sense of the
policy. We are not calling for the ﬂexibility to avoid or to legitimise not
meeting targets. Instead, we are making a proposal for cities to act and
to be judged on their actions. Valuing performance higher can
encourage cities to act, even if goals are already met, and hence can
create pressure to push cities’ performances as far as can be locally
considered feasible (e.g., Zuidema, 2017). Additionally, performance
evaluation can also avoid mishandling data or taking extreme mea-
sures. It can instead promote local authorities to do that which really
matters and is also acceptable to stakeholders for pursuing energy
intensity reductions. Finally, the action-oriented focus of performance
measuring can also be an incentive for cities to become ‘action arenas’
in which stakeholders are allowed, and even motivated, to experiment
and pursue diﬀerent projects and actions. In such arenas, learning-by-
doing and capacity building can be triggered, while provincial and state
governments may beneﬁt by learning from local approaches and tested
pilots. Within such a context, learning can show which ambitions or
amount of state or provincial policy pressure make most sense to drive
the performance of diﬀerent localities as far as is reasonable. Hence,
allowing for a more performance-oriented evaluation scheme could be
instrumental in the process of developing a national policy framework
that becomes increasingly smarter in pushing forward a Chinese energy
transition.
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